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BangladeshMany development interventions target transfers to women. However, little evidence directly explores the “ﬂy-
paper effects” of whether women retain control over these transfers once within the household and how reallo-
cation of the transfers affects women's empowerment. We study these dynamics in the context of BRAC's
randomized CFPR-TUP program in Bangladesh, which provides livestock and training to rural women in “ultra
poor” households. Our analysis conﬁrms previous ﬁndings that CFPR-TUP increased household asset ownership,
but shows complex effects on targeted women. Women appear to retain ownership over transferred livestock,
but new investments from mobilized resources are largely owned by men. CFPR-TUP also reduces women's
movement outside the home and control over income, consistent with transferred livestock requiring mainte-
nance at home. However, beneﬁciary women also report “intangible” beneﬁts such as increased social capital
and, even with limited mobility, a preference for work inside the home given a hostile environment outside
the home.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Many development interventions target transfers of resources to
women.1 This design feature is typically motivated by research that
shows greater resource control by women can improve both women's
own intrahousehold bargaining position and their children's health, nu-
trition, and education outcomes (e.g., see reviews in Quisumbing, 2003;
Yoong et al., 2012). However, it is important to note that transferring re-
sources to an individual does not necessarily guarantee that the
individual's overall resource control will increase. For example, another
household member could take over control of the resources once trans-
ferred, or other resources previously in the targeted individual's control
could be reallocated away in response to the transfer. In effect, although
an intervention may target an individual for the resource transfer,
intrahousehold dynamics may determine how resources are eventually
allocated, and the effect on the targeted individual may be theoretically
ambiguous.f a larger study using mixed
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. This is an open access article underMoreover, evidence showing individualswithin householdsmay not
share preferences or pool resources (e.g., Behrman, 1997; Haddad et al.,
1997; Schultz, 2001; Strauss and Thomas, 1995) suggests that the
intrahousehold resource allocation across individuals does matter.
Theoretical models of household decisionmaking, ranging from
bargaining models (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy, 1990; McElroy
and Horney, 1981) to partly noncooperative models (e.g. Lundberg
and Pollak, 1993) predict a relationship between individual resource
control and bargaining power. In particular, the “threat point” of indi-
viduals within a household (or union) — that is, their utility from leav-
ing the household — may determine their decision making power
within the household. This threat point may be affected by resources
controlled independently by each individual (which could be taken if
leaving the household), as well as extra-environmental parameters
that affect the desirability of leaving the household (laws governing
the labor markets, marriage, and divorce) (McElroy, 1990). Empirical
work shows support for this dynamic (Doss, 1999; Fafchamps,
Kebede, and Quisumbing, 2009; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003;
Thomas et al., 1997). This implies that since a transfer could either in-
crease the relative resource control of the targeted individual (for exam-
ple, if she retains control of it, all else equal) or decrease it (for example,
if her spouse takes control of it, all else equal), how a targeted transfer
affects intrahousehold bargaining is an empirical question.
These issues and their implications for program effects on
intrahousehold dynamics have been relatively unexplored in the empir-
ical literature. Although there is a literature on intrahousehold “ﬂypaperthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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vidual – this has generally been in the context of feeding programs
targeted to children. For example, an early review of feeding programs
(Bheaton and Gassemi, 1982) found that parents may compensate for
food or supplements targeted toward speciﬁcmembers of the household
by reducing at-home food consumption for thosemembers, or by sharing
take-home rations among other (non-targeted) household members. In
the evaluation of the ﬁrst phase of Mexico's PROGRESA, a forerunner of
many conditional cash transfer programs, one of themost serious opera-
tional problems found in the health component (Adato et al., 2000a)was
that the targeted infants and young children received only a fraction of
the nutrients that the program intended to provide, mostly because the
supplement was shared within the household.
Very few studies directly explore these “ﬂypaper effects” in the con-
text of asset transfers targeted to women — that is, explore whether
asset transfers targeted to women in fact remain in their control, in-
crease their overall resource control, and eventually increase their
bargaining position and empowerment.2 We study these dynamics in
the context of BRAC's “Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction—
Targeting the Ultra Poor” (CFPR-TUP) program in Bangladesh, a ran-
domized interventionwhich targets asset transfers (primarily livestock)
and provides training to rural women in “ultra poor” households. Previ-
ous research on the CFPR-TUP (for example, Krishna et al., 2012 and
Emran et al., 2014 on the ﬁrst phase; Bandiera et al., 2012 and
Bandiera et al., 2013 on the second phase) has shown large positive
household-level program impacts, with documented increases in
households' overall food expenditure, rates of self-employment and
labor force participation, as well as household-level ownership of pro-
ductive assets. However, there has been little exploration of how the
targeted transfer as well as other assets were reallocated within the
household and how this in turn shaped intrahousehold dynamics.
Although CFPR-TUP transfers resources to and provides training to
women, the program's explicit intention is not to promote women's
asset ownership. Instead, its aim is to build the asset base of poor house-
holds as an aggregate unit, by providing ruralwomen – forwhom socio-
cultural norms favoring female seclusion prescribe staying within the
homestead – with assets that can be maintained at home. However,
given the targeting, there are several ways in which CFPR-TUP could
plausibly shift dynamics within the household through asset transfer.
The primary mechanism we focus on is that the program could
change relative resource control across individuals within the house-
hold, with implications for intrahousehold decisionmaking as predicted
by bargaining models. As highlighted above, the direction in which the
program changes the targeted woman's relative resource control is the-
oretically ambiguous. If the transferred asset “sticks to” the targeted
woman (that is, remains in her ownership and control), all else equal,
her greater control of resources in the household could increase her rel-
ative bargaining position. Given that CFPR-TUP directed the training on
asset management toward women (albeit without stating explicitly
that the asset should be “owned” by women), it is plausible that
womenwould retain control. However, women's retention of the trans-
ferred asset is not a guarantee; the transferred asset could be diverted.
Although there is little evidence on these dynamics in the context of
asset transfers, there is suggestive evidence for intrahousehold diver-
sion of resources targeted to women across literature on agriculture2 Although there has been considerable exploration of the empowerment effects of con-
ditional cash transfer programs (e.g., Adato et al. (2000b), Attanasio and Lechene (2002),
de Brauw et al. (2014), Duﬂo (2000, 2003)), the focus has beenmore on estimating overall
impacts of transfers on women's bargaining power or decisionmaking and less on explor-
ing how control over the transfer itself was allocated within the household. Flypaper ef-
fects are more challenging to detect with cash transfers, as cash is fungible and more
difﬁcult to trace across householdmembers than physical assets. Perhaps themost closely
related work comes from laboratory or ﬁeld experiments simulating transfer programs
(Ashraf, 2009; Castilla and Walker, 2013), although the focus of these studies was on
how spousal observability affects the allocation and use of transfers by husbands and
wives.commercialization, conditional cash transfers, and microﬁnance.3 Even
if the asset is not physically taken from the woman, she may not retain
all dimensions of “control” over the transferred asset. This scenario is
particularly likely if the woman's assertion of certain control rights
over the asset goes against traditional gender norms and creates conﬂict
within the household. In a context such as rural South Asia, where patri-
archal norms and lack of social safety nets may make it challenging for
women to live outside of a union (Brule, 2012), there may be incentive
for women to give up certain control rights in order to “keep the peace.”
This dynamic is also plausible in the context of CFPR-TUP. Since most of
the assets transferred to women were cattle, which socioculturally are
considered “men's assets” in rural Bangladesh, it would be a transforma-
tion of traditional gender roles for women to take over all control rights
such as using proceeds from cattle.
On the other hand, if the program leads to another householdmem-
ber (for example, the targetedwoman's husband) gaining control of re-
sources relative to the woman, the targeted woman's relative
bargaining position could in fact worsen. One such scenario is if the
targeted transfer does not “stick” with the woman, say if the woman's
husband takes over control of the transferred asset as described above.
Another is if income generated from the transferred asset is used to
buy additional assets, which are considered to be owned and controlled
primarily by another household member rather than thewoman. These
assets could include agricultural productive assets, non-agricultural
productive assets, consumer durables, and land, many of which are
also typically considered “men's assets” in rural Bangladesh. Again, if
subverting gender norms creates conﬂict and if the external environ-
ment is hostile to women being single, the woman may voluntarily
give up control of these other assets to “keep the peace” and remain in
the union.
Control over resources could also be affected indirectly by the asset
transfer if it changes women's movements outside the homestead.
Less movement outside the home may imply less ability to physically
control resources — for example, to visit markets and purchase goods
using income earned from the assets. If another member of the house-
hold (such as the woman's husband) takes over this dimension of con-
trol over resources, there may be a shift in intrahousehold dynamics.
There are at least two ways in which the program could reduce
women's movement outside the home. First, because the assets them-
selves (mostly livestock) require maintenance at home, they have po-
tential to shift the location of women's work and their time allocation
from outside to inside the home. Second, because of sociocultural stig-
ma against womenworking outside the home and unfavorable employ-
ment conditions for women (lower wages, harrassment, etc.), evidence
suggests that it is common in Bangladesh for women in poorer house-
holds towork outside the homeout of necessity, whilewomen in slight-
ly better off households stay within the home, in part to indicate status
(BRAC RED, 2009). In this context, if the asset transfer makes the
targeted woman's household less poor overall, the woman's perceived
need to work outside the home may itself change.
Although we are not able to rigorously disentangle these mecha-
nisms, in this paper, we focus on exploring the relative resource control
of targetedwomen and other householdmembers, aswell as various di-
mensions of intrahousehold dynamics. We examine who within the
household has perceived ownership over various assets (both trans-
ferred and acquired through other means), how perceived ownership
translates to rights, and how the program's effect on these dynamics3 Early evidence in the agricultural commercialization literature (Jones, 1983; von
Braun and Webb, 1989) suggests that, when new crops were introduced to women in
Cameroon and Gambia, men took control of those crops once they became proﬁtable. Re-
cent evidence from conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico and Brazil (de Brauw
et al., 2014; Handa et al, 2009) suggests that cash transfers given to women may not be
fully controlled by women, particularly in rural areas. Studies of the impact of
microﬁnance in Bangladesh have also found that loans targeted towomen, although taken
out by women NGO members and increasing resources available to them, are often con-
trolled by their husbands (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Hashemi et al., 1996).
4 For example, although microcredit programs are widespread in rural Bangladesh, ex-
tremely poor households often cannot participate due to lack of collateral.
5 Indicators ofwomen's empowerment in the Emran et al. (2014) study included the ra-
tio of saris to lungis, the presence of female children working, whether female children
were able to read and write a letter, and the years of schooling of female children.
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measures of wellbeing for various household members. Our analysis
draws on survey data from a randomized controlled trial, with informa-
tion collected on sex-disaggregated asset ownership and control,
decisionmaking, andmeasures of women's autonomy.We complement
our analysis by drawing on qualitative work (Das et al, 2013), based on
focus group discussions and key informant interviews in treatment and
control communities that explored the sociocultural context and bene-
ﬁciaries' own perceptions of impacts from the asset transfer program.
While our analysis conﬁrms previous ﬁndings that the program sig-
niﬁcantly increases household-level asset ownership, it reveals new
ﬁndings of ambiguous effects for the targeted individual in terms of
ownership and control over various assets and decisionmaking. Results
do indicate that the transferred asset tends to remain under the targeted
woman's ownership and control. In particular, for livestock – the prima-
ry assets transferred – the program slightly increases ownership bymen
but causes much larger increases in sole or joint ownership by women.
These increases in women's livestock ownership are associated with
some increases in women's control over the livestock, including the
right to sell cattle, which is particularly notable because high-value live-
stock such as cattle are typically perceived as “men's assets” in the local
context. However, we also ﬁnd increases in household ownership of
many other assets (not directly transferred by the program), which
tend to be solely owned by men. For example, the program causes in-
creases in men's sole ownership of many types of agricultural produc-
tive assets, non-agricultural productive assets, consumer durables, and
land. For these assets, women tend not to experience increases in sole
or joint ownership, and the ownership they do perceive is not associat-
ed with most dimensions of control, although they likely experience in-
creases in the right to use some of the assets. These results suggest that
when households make investments in new assets (rather than those
transferred) due to the program, these assets are typically owned solely
bymen. Additionally, weﬁnd that theprogramdoes not change thepro-
portion of women who work but does shift work from outside to inside
the home, plausibly because the transferred asset (livestock) needs to
bemaintained within the homestead and potentially reducingmobility.
Moreover, the programsigniﬁcantly decreaseswomen's voice in a range
of decisions — including control over their own income, purchases for
themselves, and decisionmaking for household budgeting. These reduc-
tions are consistentwith economicmodels that link individuals' relative
control over resources to their intrahousehold bargaining position.
To complement the quantitative ﬁndings,we highlight insights from
the qualitative work that was part of the overall study (Das et al, 2013).
Qualitative ﬁndings are closely aligned with quantative ﬁndings in
terms of program impacts on ownership and control of assets, as well
as on mobility. Female beneﬁciaries report retaining control and man-
agement of the transferred assets, with little evidence of program assets
being taken over by husbands or other male householdmembers. Qual-
itative ﬁndings also conﬁrm that women's mobility outside the home
has been reduced by the program, due in part to the need for maintain-
ing the transferred asset at home and associated increased workloads.
However, in the perceptions of targeted women themselves, the
program's impact appears to be largely positive. In particular, the quali-
tative work suggests there were many “intangible” beneﬁts to women
that could not be easily explored quantitatively. For example, the train-
ing and support provided by the program, in addition to the improve-
ment in economic circumstances, allowed women to gain conﬁdence
and increase social capital. Qualitative ﬁndings also highlight that
work opportunities outside the home for poor women are often so
poorly paid and stigmatizing given local norms of female seclusion
that most beneﬁciary women preferred forgoing these in favor of gener-
ating income at home, even with the tradeoff of reduced mobility and
increased workload. Finally, while the quantitative work found that
the program reduced women's voice in household decisions, the quali-
tative work suggests that women themselves tended not to frame their
own empowerment in terms of individual rights or material gains.Rather, when asked about impacts of the program, they tended to de-
scribemore intangible outcomes— for example, feeling improved social
status in the community and household simply by contributing to im-
proving the economic condition of the household, taking satisfaction
in being able to send children to school, etc.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that although the targeted livestock
transfer appeared to stay with women, relative control over resources
may havemovedmore towardmen. This appears to have had consider-
able program impacts on intrahousehold dynamics, with mixed impli-
cations for the targeted women and with sociocultural context playing
an important role in how women themselves perceive its impacts.
More generally, the ﬁndings highlight that targeting an intervention to
an individual may not guarantee beneﬁts to that individual given
intrahousehold responses, and that programs may have complex and
somewhat ambiguous intrahousehold impacts even if they quite unam-
biguously increase welfare of the household in aggregate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the program and
its context inmore detail. Section 3 describes the data collected in order
to evaluate the program, including information on gender dynamics and
assets. Section 4 describes our evaluation approach, which takes advan-
tage of the program's randomized design. Section 5 presents estimates
of program impacts on intrahousehold dynamics related to gendered
asset ownership and decisionmaking, with additional insights from
the qualitative work. Section 6 summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes.
2. Description of program and program context
In 2002, BRAC initiated the ﬁrst phase of a large-scale grant-based
program in rural Bangladesh called “Challenging the Frontiers of Pover-
ty Reduction— Targeting the Ultra Poor” (CFPR-TUP or CFPR). BRAC de-
signed CFPR based on several observations regarding the rural poor in
Bangladesh: (i) poor households often lack both physical capital and
skills, (ii) although men in rural Bangladesh typically work outside the
home, women are perceived to typically stay on the homestead due to
sociocultural norms, and (iii) while there have been many programs
in rural Bangladesh directed toward women through women's groups,
the ultra-poor are marginalized.4 CFPR thus provided a transfer of pro-
ductive assets and training to women in ultra-poor households,
selecting assets that could be used for income generating activities on
the homestead, with the aim of sustainably increasing the households'
economic and social capabilities. The ﬁrst phase of CFPR ran from
2002–2006 and included 100,000 households from the poorest three
districts in Bangladesh (Rangpur, Nilphamari, and Kurigram). Because
selection into CFPR Phase I was targeted to particular types of house-
holds, evaluation of the program required a non-experimental method-
ology, with beneﬁciaries compared to a similar but non-random group
of non-beneﬁciaries. Evaluations using these non-experimental
methods (Das and Misha, 2010; Emran et al., 2014; Krishna et al.,
2012) suggested that programparticipation caused signiﬁcant improve-
ments in the livelihoods of ultra-poor households, even if it did not have
a signiﬁcant impact on women's empowerment, based on a limited set
of measures (Emran et al., 2014).5 Based on these promising ﬁndings, a
second phase (2007–2011)was launched, with expanded coverage and
a design that would provide a strong basis for impact evaluation.
This paper focuses on the second phase of the CFPR program, which
ran from 2007–2011 and followed a randomized control trial (RCT)
evaluation design. CFPR Phase II offered two different support packages
to the ultra poor, based on household characteristics: a grant-based
package for households characterized as the “Specially Targeted Ultra
Fig. 1.Map showing STUP evaluation locations.
Source: Adapted from Bandiera et al, 2012.
7 To our knowledge, “productive assets” was understood in practice to include cows,
4 S. Roy et al. / Journal of Development Economics 117 (2015) 1–19Poor” (STUP) and a “credit-plus grant” package for households charac-
terized as “Other Targeted Ultra Poor” (OTUP). In this paper, we focus
on the STUP program.
STUP was allocated according to a cluster randomized control de-
sign. Within the 13 districts where the program was rolled out in the
year 2007, one or two upazilas (subdistricts) from each district were
randomly selected.Within each of the upazilas, two BRAC branch ofﬁces
were randomly selected (see Fig. 1). 6 One of these branch ofﬁces was
randomly assigned to treatment and the other branch ofﬁce to control.
Thus, receipt of STUP was pairwise-randomly assigned at the level of
branch ofﬁces, stratiﬁed by upazila. The randomization led to 20 treat-
ment branch ofﬁces and 20 control branch ofﬁces. In treatment branch
ofﬁces, coverage by STUP of eligible households extended to the cover-
age of the ofﬁce location.
In both treatment and control branch ofﬁces, eligible households
were identiﬁed through a wealth ranking exercise called Participatory
Rural Appraisal (PRA), followed by a visit to the household by program
staff to verify information. PRA (Chambers, 1994) allowed the commu-
nity to identify households it considered to be in the bottom wealth
ranks, referred to as the “community deﬁned extreme poor.”6 Each subdistrict typically includes more than two BRAC branch ofﬁces. These branch
ofﬁces cover an area of about 6–7 km in radius.Households falling in the category of “community deﬁned extreme
poor” were then visited to check requisite inclusion and exclusion
criteria. To be eligible, STUP members must have met these criteria, de-
scribed in Bandiera et al (2013). There were three exclusion criteria, all
binding. If a household (i) was already borrowing from an NGO provid-
ing microﬁnance, (ii) was participating in a mainstream government
anti-poverty program, or (iii) had no adult women among its members,
then it was automatically excluded from the program. Furthermore, to
be selected, a household had to satisfy three of the following ﬁve inclu-
sion criteria: (i) total land owned including the homestead was not
more than 10 decimals (100 decimals = 1 acre); (ii) there was no
adult male income earner in the household; (iii) adult women in the
household worked outside the homestead; (iv) school-going-aged chil-
dren had to work; and (v) the household had no productive assets.7 A
ﬁnal round of veriﬁcation was carried out by high-level BRAC staff to
generate the ﬁnal list of households eligible for CFPR STUP support.8goats, poultry, rickshaws, boats, vans, or cars.
8 A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on samples described by Bandiera et al
(2012) indicates that eligible households likely constituted about 6% of their communities,
on average.
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or contamination effects in the control group. Bandiera et al (2012) de-
scribe that the control group households were not told that they were
the control for a study or that they would later receive a program, and
the PRA exercise was justiﬁed to them as part of BRAC's regular activi-
ties since BRAC already operated in the selected communities.9 They
also describe that the unit of randomization was chosen to be BRAC
branch ofﬁces rather than communities to minimize contamination
risk, both because neighboring communities within a branch ofﬁce
were closer together than neighboring branch ofﬁces (about 12 km
apart) and because it minimized risk that program ofﬁcers based at
the branch would not follow the randomization.
Only in STUP treatment branch ofﬁces, women in households
deemed eligible received the following: productive asset transfers for
income generating activities on the homestead (such as cows or goats
for livestock rearing, chickens or ducks for poultry rearing, etc); training
on use of the productive assets for income generating activities (IGAs); a
subsistence allowance of approximately 175 taka (about US $2.50) per
week; close supervision from program staff; health support (such
as free medical treatment, regular visits by the health volunteers
(Shasthyo Shebika) for preventive disease); and social development ini-
tiatives (community support, awareness raising training). Assets were
transferred in 2007–2008.10 The program provided various combina-
tions of productive assets (such as two cows, or a cow and ﬁve goats,
similarly valued at about 9500 Taka or US$140, according to Bandiera
et al (2013)). Approximately 90% of households received at least one
cow. The type of asset transferred to each participant household from
the pre-speciﬁed assets depended on the capability and willingness of
the participants to engage in the associated income generating activi-
ties, and suitability of the geographical locations for livestock-raising.
The purpose of providing a subsistence allowance was to compensate
beneﬁciaries' opportunity cost of time spent maintaining the IGAs
until maturity and helping smooth households' consumption, as well
as to deter beneﬁciaries from selling off the transferred assets to meet
immediate consumption needs. This allowance was provided to beneﬁ-
ciaries for 8 to 12 months depending on the type of IGA undertaken.
While the asset transfer and other program assistancewere targeted
to women in the household, and while BRAC program staff encouraged
women to use the assets for IGAs rather than selling them off, there was
no explicit instruction regardingwho in thehousehold should have con-
trol and ownership rights over the assets and how income generated
from the assets should be allocated within the household. In fact, pro-
gram documents state that the objective of the program was to build
up asset ownership of the household in aggregate, not speciﬁcally to in-
crease assets owned exclusively by women. In particular, while women
were designated responsible for maintaining the asset, the program did
not require that women participate in such decisions as whether to sell
or rent the asset, how to use income generated from the asset, etc. Rath-
er, intrahousehold dynamics determined these factors. Our focus in this
paper, therefore, is exploring these intrahousehold dynamics.
3. Evaluation design and data
3.1. Main impact evaluation survey
From 2007–2011, the BRAC Research and Evaluation Division (RED)
collected panel data on households across both treatment and control
branch ofﬁces in order to evaluate impacts of the STUP package.11 This
data collection included three rounds: 2007 (baseline, prior to9 It was originally intended that the control group would start receiving the program in
2011 (Bandiera et al (2012)), however this did not occur until after completion of the 2012
follow-up data collection used in this paper.
10 Bandiera et al (2013) note that different households received assets at slightly differ-
ent times during program roll-out across spots within a branch. We do not have access to
records of the exact date on which assets were transferred to each household.
11 .the start of intervention), 2009 and 2011. It focused primarily on
household-level information, covering quantitative socioeconomic and
health data. The sample included all households determined to be eligi-
ble per the PRA and veriﬁcation, in each of the 20 treatment branch of-
ﬁces and in each of the 20 control branch ofﬁces. The overall sample
across all 40 branch ofﬁces spanned 1409 communities (villages or
parts of villages). At the time of the baseline survey in 2007, the sample
included 7953 eligible households over treatment and control groups.12
By the 2011 round, 6919 households were successfully followed up,
representing 13% attrition from baseline. Details regarding the sampling
design and baseline balancing in characteristics of treatment and con-
trol households for the main impact evaluation are found in Bandiera
et al. (2013).
3.2. Gender and assets follow-up
3.2.1. Qualitative study
While the socioeconomic and health data included information on
asset ownership at the household level, it did not include details on
which individuals in the households owned and controlled these assets.
In preparation for ﬁelding a quantitative follow-up focusing on gender
and assets, in February–June 2011, a small qualitative study was con-
ducted in order to guide and complement the upcoming quantitative
data collection. This qualitative study aimed to inform the development
of the quantitative instruments for the 2012 survey, as well as provide
insights into the prevailing local patterns of intrahousehold asset own-
ership and on respondents' perceptions of gendered impacts of the pro-
ject. Details of the qualitative study are described in Das et al (2013).
Fifteen focus-group discussions were conducted by BRAC RED in three
districts (a subset of those included in the quantitative survey) and in-
cluded groups of only female participants in beneﬁciary households,
groups of only male spouses in beneﬁciary households, groups of only
females from non-beneﬁciary households, and groups of only males
from non-beneﬁciary households. In addition, in each treatment branch
ofﬁce in each of the three districts, two key-informant interviews were
conducted: onewith the CFPR-TUP ProgramOrganiser and onewith the
local Gram Daridro Bimochon Committee (GDBC) member who had
long-term experience with the program. Fieldwork was conducted in
Bangla, and analysis of the qualitative data was conducted using QSR
nVivo 9 based on English translation of the transcripts.
3.2.2. Quantitative gender and assets follow-up
The follow-up quantitative survey was ﬁelded in January–April,
2012, focusing on gender and assets, including detailed questions on
sex-disaggregated ownership and control over a large range of assets,
dynamics of intrahousehold decision making, and women's autonomy.
The present authors contributed to the design and implementation of
this follow-up. The design of the gender and assets survey instrument
drew extensively on preliminary ﬁndings from the qualitative work.
For example, the list of assets included several that may not be com-
monly thought of as major assets but that were named as being often
“owned” by and important to women. These included consumer dura-
bles (such as jewelry, sarees, and cooking implements), which can
serve as stores of value as well as be important factors in acquiring
other forms of capital (e.g., having suitable clothes or a space in the
home considered a “living room”may be important in developing social
capital).
Based on the qualitative work, a distinction was also made in the
quantitative instrument between having “ownership” and speciﬁc “con-
trol rights” over assets. In particular, because it appeared that the notion
of ownership did not translate to aﬁxed set of control rights and in some
cases differed by asset, the two categories were considered separately.12 The survey also included 19,012 non-eligible households in the sample, to assess spill-
over effects on otherwealth classes. This paper focuses onanalyzing direct impacts on only
the eligible households.
Table 1
Balancing of baseline mean characteristics between nonattrited treatment and control
groups, accounting for attrition weights.
Baseline characteristic Control Treatment P-value of
difference
Household's wealth rank (6 = lowest) 4.81 4.79 0.60
Whether household owns
house (1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.83 0.84 0.47
Whether household owns
land (1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.06 0.06 0.77
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whatever their own notion was of ownership to characterize who
owned each asset, while they were additionally asked about certain
control rights over the asset. We focus on three speciﬁc dimensions of
control rights in our analysis: (1) the right to use the asset: the use of
an asset may increase an individual's well-being in various intangible
ways (for example, use of good clothes improving self-esteem or social
status), irrespective of whether the individual has any other rights over
the asset; (2) the right to sell the asset: this dimension captures alien-
ation rights, characterized as the deﬁning feature of ownership in the
property rights literature (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992); and (3) the
right to decide how to use incomegenerated from the asset: this dimen-
sion of rights may link most concretely to the individual's ability to ob-
tain tangible economic beneﬁts from the asset.13
Based on qualitative insights, the quantitative survey also allowed
for not only “sole” ownership of assets by single individuals but for
joint ownership across several individuals. Questions were asked such
that two different indicators could be analyzed for women's role in
ownership and control: whether women had “sole” ownership or con-
trol, as well as whether they had “any” ownership or control (sole,
joint with spouse, joint with other household members, or joint with
household as a whole).
Because this follow-up survey focused on how the program affected
dynamics in households headed by a male and female partnership, the
sample was restricted to households either with a male household
head and female spouse, or with a female household head and male
spouse. Attempts were made to re-interview all households included
in the baseline round that met these criteria. At baseline, of the 7953 el-
igible households interviewed in total over treatment and control
groups, 7392 households met these criteria. Of these, 6066 households
were successfully followed up in the gender and assets survey – 3467
treatment households and 2599 control households – representing
18% attrition from the baseline sample. In all sampled households for
the gender and assets survey, the primary respondentwas the “main fe-
male”member of the household (either the female head or the female
spouse of male head). Appendix Table A.1 shows this breakdown in fur-
ther detail.Area of household's owned land
that is cultivated (decimals)
0.94 0.82 0.65
Value of household's owned land
that is cultivated (taka)
2239.22 1824.64 0.52
Area of household's owned pond land (decimals) 0.02 0.03 0.39
Value of household's owned pond land (taka) 64.36 76.02 0.81
Area of household's owned land that is
mortgaged out (decimals)
0.39 0.34 0.74
Value of household's owned land
that is mortgaged out (taka)
1529.78 737.46 0.17
Number of cows owned by household 0.07 0.08 0.49
Number of goats/sheep owned by household 1.78 1.79 0.95
Number of power pumps owned by household b0.01 b0.01 –
Number of plows owned by household b0.01 b0.01 –
Number of cowsheds owned by household 0.09 0.11 0.12
Number of ﬁshnets owned by household 0.02 0.03 0.59
Number of rickshaws owned by household 0.01 0.02 0.22
Number of trees owned by household 0.95 0.64 0.21
Number of radios owned by household 0.03 0.01 0.16
Number of electric fans owned by household 0.01 0.01 0.25
Number of bicycles owned by household 0.03 0.02 0.23
Number of chairs owned by household 0.23 0.21 0.34
Number of tables owned by household 0.16 0.14 0.15
Number of choukis (cots) owned by household 0.85 0.86 0.77
Number of sofas owned by household 0.01 0.01 0.83
Number of jewelry items owned by household b0.01 b0.01 –
Number of saris owned by household 0.31 0.33 0.363.3. Sample attrition
As we note above, there was considerable attrition between the
baseline round in 2007 and the follow-up round in 2012. Our analysis
indicates that attrition is slightly but signiﬁcantly correlated with base-
line characteristics of households and individuals that may also be cor-
related with our outcomes of interest.14 The following characteristics
are linked to higher probability of a household attriting from the sample
between baseline and follow-up: being a treatment household; living in
a “dilapidated” home at baseline; owning land; not owning its home;
owning more saris; owning fewer goats/sheep; owning agricultural as-
sets such as a pump; and living in certain branch ofﬁces. These corre-
lates are generally in line with reports from the ﬁeld that the high rate
of non-response in the January–April 2012 round was because these
months coincided with the “boro” planting and harvesting season in
Bangladesh, when rural households become particularly busy. It is
roughly consistent with this story that, all else equal, households with
land and more agricultural assets were more likely to be busy, while
somewhat better off households (those with better homes, for exam-
ple) were slightly less busy, for example if they were able to hire labor13 As deﬁned by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), p. 251“the alienation right is a collective-
choice right permitting its holder to transfer all or part of the collective choice rights to an
individual or to another group. Exercising a right of alienation means that an individual
sells or leases the rights to management, exclusion, or both.”
14 Estimates of the probability of staying in the non-attrited sample are shown in
Appendix Table A.2.rather than serving as day laborers themselves. In any case, given that
attrition appears to be non-random, we account for it in order to mini-
mize bias in impact estimates. We do so by constructing inverse proba-
bility weights for each set of outcomes we study (asset ownership and
control by men and women, decisions on work and expenditures, im-
pacts on livelihoods), following the methodology of Fitzgerald et al.
(1998).
Once attrition weights are incorporated, we ﬁnd that household
characteristics of our endline sample appear to no longer be systemati-
cally correlatedwith treatment status at baseline. Table 1 presents base-
line means for characteristics of treatment and control households that
remain in the sample for the 2012 follow-up round, as well as statistical
signiﬁcance of the differences between groups. Results indicate that
these samples are balanced at baseline once attrition weights are
applied.4. Evaluation approach
Our approach to evaluating impacts of the STUP intervention on gen-
der and asset outcomes takes advantage of the RCT design of the inter-
vention. We wish to estimate the average difference between the
outcomes of beneﬁciaries assigned to receive the program and the
counterfactual outcomes of those same beneﬁciaries had they not
been assigned to the program. While it is not possible to directlyWhether main female works as a homemaker
only (1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.96 0.97 0.11
Main female's years of education 0.55 0.60 0.25
Main male's years of education 0.56 0.60 0.42
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Note: All differences are statistically insigniﬁcant at the 10 percent level. “Main female” re-
fers to female head or female spouse of head. “Main male” refers to male head or male
spouse of head.
15 We note that although treatment is random, the speciﬁc type of asset provided condi-
tional on treatment is not random. As described in Section 2, both the household and the
program had some role in choosing which package of assets the household received. For
this reason we do not present impacts disaggregated by asset type, since asset type may
be endogenous. Instead in our main results we present impacts on only the pooled treat-
ment (over all asset types). In estimation over the pooled treatment and control, the fact
that asset type was not random does not create any bias.
16 Athough the reports of “which” assets were received are generally plausible and con-
sistent with what we know about the program, the recalled reports of numbers received
are considerably less plausible. For example, some beneﬁciaries report receiving 7 cows,
which is not consistent with the program's protocol. We suspect these issues might be
due in part to the long (though unavoidable for us) recall period.
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group in this study can serve as a reasonable proxy. The randomized as-
signment of a large sample of eligible households to treatment and con-
trol groups helps to ensure that observable and unobservable
characteristics of the households were likely balanced across the two
groups at baseline.
In the absence of nonrandom attrition, any differences between
the treatment and control households at follow-up could then be
interpreted as causal impacts of the program. As we show in
Section 3, there was in fact considerable attrition in our sample by
the 2012 follow-up; however, the use of inverse probability attrition
weights balances a large set of observable baseline household char-
acteristics across treatment and control groups in our non-attrited
sample. With these attrition weights incorporated, any signiﬁcant
differences in outcomes between the non-attrited treatment and
control groups in 2012 can reasonably be interpreted as attributable
to the program.
We note that ideally we would have preferred to have baseline
information on all our key outcomes, such that we could empirically
conﬁrm balancing in these indicators as well and use double-
difference or ANCOVA estimates to account for any small differences
in baseline values to improve precision of estimates. Because the
baseline survey from the main impact evaluation did not contain in-
formation on our outcomes of interest related to intrahousehold dy-
namics, use of baseline information to explore impacts on these
outcomes was not possible. However, given that the treatment was
randomly assigned and that we ﬁnd balancing in a large set of ob-
servable characteristics available at baseline with sample attrition
weights incorporated, concern over baseline differences is mini-
mized. As a further robustness check, we also estimate Lee (2009) at-
trition bounds in our main results.
We also note that our estimates of impact are average “intent to
treat” impacts of the STUP intervention, relying on the randomized as-
signment to avoid any bias due to self-selection in takeup. However, be-
cause the takeup rate of the programwas quite high, close to 90%, these
intent to treat estimates are likely close approximations to average
treatment effects on the treated.
The basic speciﬁcation for single-difference estimation is as fol-
lows, for a household i in branch ofﬁce b, with each outcomemeasure
denoted as Yib the branch ofﬁce's treatment indicator denoted as
Treatmentb, and the error term denoted as εib : Yib = β0 + β1 ∗
Treatmentb + εib. We estimate this speciﬁcation accounting for
inverse-probability attrition weights on each observation of house-
hold i in branch ofﬁce b.
5. Results
5.1. Norms of gendered asset ownership
Understanding local gender norms regarding livestock ownership is
useful in interpreting our impact estimates. The qualitative work in this
study (Das et al, 2013) indicated strong gender norms in rural
Bangladesh regarding ownership of livestock, the main type of asset
transferred by BRAC. Focus group discussions indicated that small live-
stock such as poultry were typically seen as belonging to women— be-
cause poultry were kept near the homestead and usually fed and
managed by women, because poultry keeping was a low-value and
low-status economic activity, and because poultry were more likely
than high-value livestock to be bought or sold informally without the
need to be taken to markets (daily “bazaars” or weekly “haats”) that
were seen as “men's places.”Meanwhile, larger livestock such as cattle
were typically perceived as belonging to men. While they were also
kept near homesteads and mostly tended and managed by women,
they were both higher in value and more often traded in markets,
such that their sale usually required an adult male's consent and help.
Respondents tended to perceive nonlivestock assets as belonging tomen or women depending on whose activities they were more closely
associated with. Assets associated withmale income generation, partic-
ularly away from the home – such as cultivation equipment –were per-
ceived as nearly exclusively controlled and “owned” by men. Assets
associated with women's work – food preparation and cooking – were
perceived as managed by women and sometimes lent, bought, or sold
without a husband's permission. These patterns suggest that, among
the assets transferred to women, the most valuable livestock assets –
cattle –were typically considered assets owned bymen in the study set-
ting. Lower-value transferred assets of poultry weremore typically con-
sidered assets owned by women. Moreover, most assets other than
livestock that could be used away from the home and were not trans-
ferred by the program – such as equipment used for agricultural pro-
duction – were typically perceived as owned by men. To provide
further context for the program impacts we estimate below, we also
present descriptive statistics in Appendix Tables A.3–A.8 for all our
key outcomes, as measured in the control group in the quantitative
follow-up round. The mean values shown for the control group, ac-
counting for attrition weights, represent what the mean counterfactual
situationwould have been for the treatment group in the absence of the
program, in terms of men's and women's asset ownership, women's
work, and decisionmaking about women's income and household
expenditures.
5.2. Assets received by beneﬁciary households
As additional context for understanding program impacts, it is useful
to summarize the assets that beneﬁciary households received.15 Unfor-
tunately we do not have access to the program's records on what pack-
age of assets was transferred to each household. However, in our 2012
round, we did attempt to collect beneﬁciaries' self-reports on what
was transferred in 2007–2008 via recall. This information is missing
for about 15% of treatment households in the sample. Of the 85% of
treatment households in the sample for which we have information,
92% of the households report receiving a cow, while only 8% report
not receiving a cow, consistent with what we know of the program.
Table 2 summarizes these details.16
5.3. Program impacts
As described above, in all of our impact estimates, we estimate
single-difference estimates, taking into account attrition weights. We
moreover adjust standard errors to account for the intervention design
and survey design. In particular, our estimates account for the stratiﬁca-
tion of randomization at the upazila level and the cluster-level random-
ization at the branch ofﬁce level.
Our discussion of the impact estimates proceeds from immediate
impacts of BRAC's asset transfer on intrahousehold asset ownership
and control, to “downstream” impacts on work and decisionmaking
that may arise because of the asset transfer.
5.3.1. Impacts on intrahousehold ownership of livestock assets
Because the program transfers livestock assets to ultra-poor house-
holds, we expect that the most direct impact of the program will be
Table 3
Impacts on intrahousehold livestock ownership, by asset type.
Treatment impact on number of livestock
Livestock Total
owned in
household
Owned
solely by
female
Owned in
any part by
female
Owned jointly
by male and
female
Owned
solely by
male
Cows/buffalo 1.036*** 0.817*** 0.958*** 0.129*** 0.076***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.014) (0.013)
Goats/sheep 0.220*** 0.159*** 0.192*** 0.026** 0.026***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.036) (0.011) (0.010)
Chickens/ducks 0.883*** 0.779*** 0.803*** 0.027 0.079***
(0.123) (0.116) (0.121) (0.029) (0.023)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted
for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
Table 2
Transferred assets received by TUP, self-reported recall of treatment households in 2012.
Availability of self-reported
recall on transferred assets
Conditional on non-missing report, %
of HH reporting that they received any…
Missing reports of
transferred assets
15% (521) Cows 92% (2703)
Goats/sheep 33% (963)
Chickens/ducks 21% (622)
Non-missing reports
of transferred assets
85% (2946) Nursery b1% (3)
Vegetable cultivation b1% (9)
Small business b1% (25)
Other assets b1% (11)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2012.
Notes: Number of relevant observations in parentheses. N = 3467.
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livestock.17 However, it is not straightforward whether transferring
livestock to women will lead to ownership of livestock remaining with
women, or instead to livestock ownership being taken over by another
household member. We begin by exploring these dynamics.
For each type of livestock asset listed, the survey asks how many
total are owned in the household, then how many are perceived to be
owned solely by the woman, solely by her husband, jointly between
her and her spouse, jointly by her and other household members, and
jointly by the household as a whole. We construct unconditional mea-
sures for the number of each type of livestock owned total in the house-
hold; owned solely by the female; owned in any part by the female
(meaning, solely, jointly with her spouse, jointly with other household
members, or jointly by the household); owned solely by her husband;
or owned jointly by her and her husband.18 Table 3 shows that accord-
ing to the main female's reports, at the household level, the program
signiﬁcantly increased ownership of livestock such as cows/buffalo,
goat/sheep, and chickens/ducks. This increase is consistent with the
program's direct transfer of livestock and indicates that households
retained ownership of the assets rather than selling them off. A closer
look at the intrahousehold distribution of livestock ownership indicates
that the program increases livestock owned solely by men, as well as
jointly by men andwomen, but causes the largest increases in livestock
owned solely by women or in any part by women.
We interpret these patterns as indicating that TUP's transfer of live-
stock to women “stuck”mostly to women, at least in terms of perceived
ownership.19 This pattern includes cows, which as mentioned above, is
notable since sociocultural norms in Bangladesh tend to categorize
high-value livestock such as cattle as men's assets.17 Although the program protocol includes other possible asset transfers, in practice
nearly all transfers were livestock, as reﬂected in beneﬁciaries' self-reported recall on
transfers in our 2012 survey (Table 2).
18 Ideally we would have also analyzed “net” impacts on livestock ownership
(i.e., subtracting the number of livestock directly transferred by TUP from the number
owned in 2012). Unfortunately we do not have access to programs records on the exact
package of livestock assets transferred to each beneﬁciary household. We attempted to
collect this information through recall in our 2012 follow-up round, but while the types
of livestock that households reported receiving were plausible, the self-reported numbers
were often implausible (e.g., some reported 7 cows received, which is inconsistent with
program protocol) such that resulting estimates would unlikely be informative. About
15% of treatment households also hadmissing information on transferred assets, such that
focusing on net impacts would substantially (and possibly nonrandomly) reduce sample
size.
19 We note that, although it is plausible that general equilibrium effects could also affect
intrahousehold distribution of livestock ownership in program areas (for example, if the
program's provision of livestock led to changes in livestock prices), existing evidence sug-
gests these were unlikely to play a major role. Bandiera et al (2012) analyze program im-
pacts on market prices for livestock and ﬁnd a small decrease in poultry prices (by about
9%), but no change in cattle or goat prices. They also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change in prices of
output derived from livestock, such as milk and eggs. A small reduction in poultry prices
seems unlikely to drive our results on livestock ownership or other subsequently present-
ed results.5.3.2. Impacts on intrahouseold ownership of other assets
While the program directly transferred livestock (as well as the small
cash allowances), it is possible that ownership of other types of assetswas
affected aswell. As described in Section 1, even if the transferred livestock
“sticks” towomen (at least in terms of perceived ownership), it is possible
that other assets “shift away” from the woman and toward other house-
holdmembers in response, such that the overall effect on intrahousehold
asset ownership is more ambiguous. In order to explore the interplay in
these dynamics, we group assets into several aggregate categories: live-
stock (the items described in Section 5.3.1), agricultural productive assets,
non-agricultural productive assets, consumer durables, land, and cash.
The survey asks questions about a range of items in each of these asset
categories (chosen based on the qualitativework), analogous to the ques-
tions asked for livestock items. We ﬁrst construct the number owned of
each asset type over the same ownership categories as for the individual
livestock items (i.e., ownedby the household in total, by the female solely,
by the female in anypart, by the female andmale jointly, by themale sole-
ly). Appendix Tables A.9–A.12 shows program impacts on these individu-
al assets within each broad asset category.
Then, owing to the large number of assets types within each catego-
ry, for brevity and ease of interpretation, we construct an aggregate
measure of ownership for each category by calculating the overall
value of assets owned within each of the main asset categories. In the
survey, for each asset owned in the household, the total current value
of the asset (in Taka) owned by the household was recorded. In order
to construct the aggregate, for each asset type we impute the value
owned in each ownership category by dividing the household's total
owned value proportionally over the number in each ownership
category.20 Because there are active land and asset markets in rural
Bangladesh, self-reported asset valuations can be considered a reason-
able proxy for the truemarket value of the asset, permitting an aggrega-
tion based on asset value.
Table 4 shows program impacts on the aggregate values owned of
each of the asset categories, incorporating both attritionweights and in-
dicating attrition bounds below each estimate (Lee, 2009); all of the es-
timates, both at the household and intrahousehold levels, fall within the
Lee bounds. At the household level, impacts on all of these aggregate
asset categories in terms of value are fairly large and statistically signif-
icant. Intrahousehold impacts vary however by asset category.2120 Wemake the assumption that all units of a particular asset type are of the same value,
regardless of who owns them. For example, if a household owns two cows which in total
are worth 20,000 Taka, but one cow is solely owned by the woman and the other cow is
solely owned by the man, we assume the woman solely owns 10,000 Taka worth of cows
and the man solely owns 10,000 Taka worth of cows. If in fact men typically own higher-
value items than women even within an asset type, this assumption would overestimate
the value owned by women and underestimate the value owned by men.
21 Both household and intrahousehold impacts based on aggregate values are consistent
with the pattern of impacts on the number of each asset type presented in
Appendix Tables A.9–A.12, giving further support to use of the self-reported valuations.
Table 4
Impacts on intrahousehold asset ownership by asset categories, in terms of aggregate value (Taka).
Treatment impacts on aggregate value of...
Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by 
female
Owned jointly by male 
and female
Owned solely by male
Livestock 11,703*** 9,090*** 10,768*** 1,511*** 942***
(410) (401) (420) (192) (148)
Lee Bounds 11,237*** to 14,131*** 8,770*** to 10,857*** 10,367*** to 12,965*** 1,463*** to 1,952*** 886*** to 1,412***
(346) (240) (306) (235) (340) (277) (175) (160) (118) (98)
Agricultural 725*** 173*** 343*** 98*** 375***
(82) (25) (65) (37) (48)
Lee Bounds 647*** to 1,072*** 143*** to 331*** 292*** to 602*** 81** to 196*** 346*** to 556***
(79) (71) (21) (18) (65) (59) (34) (32) (45) (36)
Non-
agricultural
1,055*** 26 356*** 153*** 681***
(137) (48) (88) (40) (93)
Lee Bounds 850*** to 1,938*** -25 to 363*** 236*** to 941*** 135*** to 250*** 601*** to 1,222***
(119) (101) (47) (33) (78) (62) (34) (30) (90) (76)
Consumer 
Durables
4,894*** 767*** 2,093*** 704*** 2,437***
(785) (295) (513) (209) (388)
Lee Bounds 3,317*** to 9,249*** 124 to 2,888*** 950** to 5,427*** 483*** to 1,935*** 1826*** to 5,129***
(771) (640) (276) (163) (468) (333) (172) (140) (356) (235)
Land 13,676*** 1,808 2,460 -56 11,292***
(4,278) (1,630) (2,975) (386) (2,670)
Lee Bounds 7,027* to 40,621*** 217 to 11,948*** -918 to 19,571*** -208 to 539*** 8,101*** to 28,502***
(3820) (2,535) (1504) (1,129) (2780) (1,770) (444) (145) (2,703) (1,843)
Cash 1,279*** 1,050*** 1,218*** 148*** 61*
(85) (59) (74) (42) (35)
Lee Bounds 1,233*** to 1,626*** 1,017*** to 1,319*** 1,175*** to 1,536*** 142*** to 194*** 59 to 93***
(78) (71) (53) (46) (67) (60) (37) (36) (37) (36)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. Treatment impacts in shaded rows are single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard
errors adjusted for surveydesign and clustering are shown inparentheses. Lee boundsbeloweach shaded row represent the lower and upper bounds for each
treatment impact, with standard errors in parantheses. All estimated coefﬁcients and standard errors are rounded to the nearest whole number. *** p b 0.01,
** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
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each distinct type of livestock shown in Table 3, the overall impact on
aggregate value of livestock owned is highest for women. The program
causes a signiﬁcant increase of about 9090 Taka in women's sole per-
ceived ownership and about 10,768 Taka in women's any perceived
ownership (including joint). The aggregate value of livestock that is per-
ceived as owned solely by men increases signiﬁcantly as well but by
only about 942 Taka.
However, the pattern is reversed for the aggregated categories of agri-
cultural productive assets, non-agricultural productive assets, consumer
durables, and land. The overall impact on aggregate value of each of
these categories is highest for men's sole perceived ownership. In the
case of agricultural productive assets, the program signiﬁcantly increases
men's sole ownership by about 375 Taka, while it increases women's sole
ownership by about 173 Taka and any ownership (including joint) by
about 343 Taka. In the case of non-agricultural productive assets, the pro-
gram signiﬁcantly increases men's sole ownership by about 681 Taka,
while there is no signiﬁcant impact on women's sole ownership and an
increase of about 356 Taka for any ownership (including joint). In the
case of consumer durables, the program signiﬁcantly increases men's
sole ownership by about 2437 Taka, while women's sole ownership in-
creases by about 767 Taka and any ownership (including joint) increases
by about 2093 Taka. The difference is most stark for land. In the case of
land, the program signiﬁcantly increases men's sole ownership by about
11,292 Taka, while it has no signiﬁcant impact on women's sole owner-
ship or any ownership (including joint). This reﬂects that the large signif-
icant increase in land ownership at the household level is highly
concentrated in men's exclusive ownership.
Finally, Table 4 shows the impacts reported on perceived ownership
of cash. Here impacts are again highest for women. The program signif-
icantly increases women's sole perceived ownership by about 1050Taka and any perceived ownership (including joint) by 1218 Taka; the
impact on men's sole perceived ownership is a weakly signiﬁcant in-
crease of 61 Taka.
Overall the pattern in ownership impacts over asset categories
shows that the program causes the biggest increases of value in per-
ceived ownership of livestock and cash for women, while it causes the
biggest increases of value in perceived ownership of agricultural pro-
ductive assets, non-agricultural productive assets, consumer durables,
and land for men. Given that, in addition to the livestock transfers pro-
vided towomen, TUP also provided small cash grants, we interpret both
these increases to be indicative of program features “sticking” to
women, at least in terms of perceived ownership.
Program impacts onmales for the other asset categories suggest that
income generated from the transferred assets were mobilized into new
investments in non-livestock assets, falling along patterns of gender
norms. Appendix Tables A.9–A.12 highlight these patterns. Within agri-
cultural productive assets, the increases at the household level appear to
generally come either from complementarity with receiving a livestock
transfer (e.g., a cow shed for cattle) or from new investments in agricul-
ture outside the home (e.g., chopper, plows, axes). Given norms in
Bangladesh of agricultural work outside the home being associated
with men, it follows that if increased income in households from the
transfer translated to new investment in agricultural assets, those assets
would be perceived as owned by men. Within non-agricultural produc-
tive assets, new investments in household ownership tend to translate
to increased sole ownership by males, particularly for assets related to
increased mobility or work outside the home (e.g., bicycles, rickshaws)
but also for some that theoretically could be owned by either males or
females (e.g., mobile phones). Within consumer durables, new invest-
ments in household ownership again tend to translate to increased
sole ownership by males even for assets that theoretically could be
Table 5
Women's rights over livestock assets, conditional on ownership, by treatment status, 2012.
Livestock % of HH that
own any
Conditional on HH owning, % of HH
in which woman has the right to (…)
% of HH in which woman
owns in any part
Conditional on woman owning in any part, %
of HH in which woman has the right to (…)
Sell Decide how to spend money generated
from
Sell Decide how to spend money generated
from
Cows/buffalo C 17 54 78 13 62 85
T 70 65 73 62 71 79
Goats/sheep C 13 69 85 11 76 92
T 25 67 72 22 76 81
Chickens/ducks C 34 84 90 33 85 91
T 47 76 78 44 81 82
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Includes all livestock assets asked about in 2012 survey, except thosewhich few households in either intervention arm reported owning (horses, pigeons, other; these are included
in the aggregate measure in Table 4). N = 6066 (2599 control [C] and 3467 treatment [T]).
Table 6
Women's rights over agricultural assets, conditional on ownership, by treatment status, 2012.
% of HH that own any Conditional on HH owning, % of HH in
which woman has the right to (…)
% of HH in which woman
owns in any part
Conditional on woman owning in any part,
% of HH in which woman has the right to (…)
Use Sell Decide how to spend money
generated from
Use Sell Decide how to spend money
generated from
Choppers C 57 99 59 81 43 99 76 89
T 67 99 43 60 42 99 66 80
Stored crops (kg) C 4 100 55 77 3 100 72 92
T 12 100 37 52 6 100 71 85
Cowsheds C 27 99 54 81 20 99 69 88
T 48 99 41 60 29 99 65 81
Ladders C 3 100 42 55 2 100 66 72
T 4 97 37 60 2 100 72 81
Mowing machines C 78 99 60 82 56 99 76 91
T 75 99 51 70 51 99 72 86
Plows C 1 86 17 60 b1 100 42 85
T 2 86 14 55 b1 95 36 68
Axes C 31 99 39 71 15 99 67 87
T 43 99 31 56 20 99 59 80
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Includes all agricultural assets asked about in 2012 survey, except those which few households in either intervention arm reported owning (tractors, threshingmachines, ladders,
deep tube wells, pumps, spray machines, carts, other; these are included in the aggregate measure in Table 4). N = 6066 (2599 control [C] and 3467 treatment [T]).
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instruments, clothing, housing infrastructure, notably even gold jewel-
ry). Similarly, within land, new investments in household ownership
translate almost exclusively to increased sole ownership by males, con-
sistent with gendered norms of land ownership in Bangladesh.5.3.3. Rights associated with perceived ownership over assets
As described in Section 3.2, our qualitative work showed that re-
spondents' notion of ownership did not necessarily translate to a ﬁxed
set of control rights and in some cases differed by asset. To further inter-
pret the patterns of intrahousehold program impacts we ﬁnd on per-
ceived ownership, we present descriptive analysis on which control
rights typically translate to perceived ownership.
In all households in our 2012 survey, for each asset owned by the
household, the female respondent was asked about her rights over the
asset. 22 We use these responses to assess how women's perceived22 The questions on rights were asked of the woman respondent in all households. Due
to ﬁeld budget constraints, in only a randomly pre-selected 20% of households, the rights
questions were also asked of the woman's husband for purposes of comparison. Within
these 20% of households, for any asset owned by anyone in the household, nearly all
men in both treatment and control groups reported having all of the rights asked about.
Even when men reported that the asset in question was owned solely by their wives
(and not solely or jointly by the men themselves), over 95% of men in both treatment
and control groups reported that they had all of these rights over the asset. The only excep-
tion was in women's clothing, for which about 70% of men reported having these rights.
Based on these ﬁndings, we focus our analysis for the full sample onwomen's rights, with
the assumption that men in our sample typically have rights over all assets in the house-
hold regardless of who is perceived to own them.ownership is associated with rights and how this depends on treatment
status. 23
Table 5 focuses on livestock. The table describes how ownership
over each type of livestock translates on average to women's rights
over the livestock, depending on whether women are in the treatment
or control group. For each livestock asset owned by the household, we
construct conditional indicators for the woman's right to sell it and
the right to decide how to spend income generated from it (the right
to “use” is not relevant for livestock). Statistics are broken down in
twoways: conditional on anyone in the household owning the livestock
asset, then conditional on thewoman's perception that she herself owns
the asset (solely or jointly). Table 5 shows that, relative to women in
cattle-owning control households, women in cattle-owning treatment
households are somewhat more likely to have rights to sell the cattle
but slightly less likely to have rights to decide how to spend income
generated from the cattle. Within the subset of households in which
women perceive that they themselves own the cattle, the same pattern23 Herewe focus on associations rather than impacts. The survey asked only about rights
over assets that were owned in the household in 2012, rather than hypothetical rights
over assets not owned. An alternative to presenting descriptives on conditional indicators
might have been to estimate impacts on these conditional indicators. However, condition-
al impact estimation is problematic, since to estimate rights over livestock for example, we
would likely compare treatment households (that had livestock at follow-up but may not
have in the absence of the program) with initially better-off control households (that had
livestock at follow-up even without receiving the program). Correcting for the selection
bias in owning livestock, as required for valid conditional impact estimates, would require
strong assumptions on determinants of livestock ownership in the control group that
would also be problematic.
Table 7
Women's rights over non-agricultural assets, conditional on ownership, by treatment status, 2012.
% of HH
that own any
Conditional on HH owning, % of HH in
which woman has the right to (…)
% of HH in which woman
owns in any part
Conditional on woman owning in any part, %
of HH in which woman has the right to (…)
Use Sell Decide how to spend money
generated from
Use Sell Decide how to spend money
generated from
Bicycles C 9 92 15 52 3 90 25 47
T 11 75 7 27 4 70 13 32
Mobile phones C 17 98 26 56 12 98 33 61
T 24 98 12 37 13 97 19 45
Bamboo materials C 68 99 74 88 59 99 83 92
T 60 99 61 76 48 99 73 85
Trees C 30 99 45 74 17 99 71 87
T 38 98 34 57 19 98 65 83
Rickshaws C 4 90 14 57 1 77 22 66
T 5 75 5 34 1 68 13 50
Fishnets C 3 89 40 63 1 89 68 72
T 6 87 18 46 1 91 46 56
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Includes all non-agricultural assets asked about in 2012 survey, except those which few households in either intervention arm reported owning (motorcycles, CNGs, sewing
machines, computers, small business materials, boats, husking equipment, cottage materials, other; these are included in the aggregate measure in Table 4). N = 6066 (2599 control
[C] and 3467 treatment [T]).
Table 8
Women's rights over consumer durables, conditional on ownership, by treatment status, 2012.
% of HH that
own any
Conditional on HH
owning, % of HH in
which woman has the
right to (…)
% of HH in
which woman
owns in any part
Conditional on woman
owning in any part, % of
HH in which woman
has the right to (…)
Use Sell Use Sell
Chairs C 34 99 41 21 99 60
T 43 99 33 24 99 54
Beds C 85 99 53 57 99 66
T 89 99 41 52 99 61
Almirahs C 31 99 54 24 99 66
T 40 98 40 26 98 59
Tube wells C 33 99 32 18 98 53
T 46 99 31 24 99 56
Cooking instruments C 99 99 74 92 99 78
T 99 99 62 84 99 72
Men's clothing items C 68 – 27 52 – 30
T 79 – 11 59 – 13
Women's clothing items C 99 99 77 98 99 78
T 99 98 67 95 98 70
Silver jewelry items C 11 98 77 10 98 77
T 9 92 58 9 92 58
Gold jewelry items C 39 96 58 38 96 58
T 50 92 51 47 92 54
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Includes all consumer durables asked about in 2012 survey, except those which few households in either intervention arm reported owning (radios, TVs, cameras, VCRs, fans,
watches, mosquito nets, living rooms, latrines, solar, other; these are included in the aggregate measure in Table 4). N = 6066 (2599 control [C] and 3467 treatment [T]).
24 The questions on rights are not as directly relevant to cash (e.g., there is no clear coun-
terpart to “using” cashwithout depleting it or to “selling” cash), sowe do not show similar
tables. However, the analysis of impacts on control over earnings and expenditures shown
later in Sections 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 gives some indication that women's perceived ownership
over cash may translate to limited rights over it.
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across both groups report rights in this subset than in the overall sam-
ple, even within this subset considerably fewer than 100% of women
tend to report that they have the rights asked about, reﬂecting that
these rights for women are not considered necessary conditions for
women's perceived ownership. The pattern for goats/sheep and
chickens/duck is similar to that for cattle: relative to the control, owner-
ship in the treatment translates to fairly similar rights to sell, but slightly
lower rights on spending decisions. We emphasize that these differ-
ences in conditional averages cannot be interpreted as impacts; the av-
erage control household that owned livestock in 2012 was likely
different even prior to the program from the average treatment house-
hold that owned livestock in 2012, given that the program itself trans-
ferred livestock. However, the descriptives support the possibility that,
when livestock is transferred to women by TUP rather than obtained
in someotherway,women's perception of “owning” the livestock trans-
lates to their having similar or greater sale rights over the livestock butslightly lower spending-decision rights. This ﬁndingwould suggest that
Table 4's positive program impacts on women's perceived livestock
ownership may translate to women having strengthened alienation
rights over livestock (again particularly notable for cattle, given prevail-
ing gender norms), but perhaps not strengthened rights to obtain con-
crete economic beneﬁts from livestock.
Tables 6 to 9 show analogous statistics for agricultural productive as-
sets, non-agricultural productive assets, consumer durables, and land. 24
We construct conditional indicators for the right to use (relevant for all),
the right to sell (relevant for all), and the right to decide how to spend
generated income (relevant for all except consumer durables). Across
Table 9
Women's rights over land assets, conditional on household ownership, by treatment status, 2012.
Land % of HH that
own any
Conditional on HH owning, % of HH in
which woman has the right to (…)
% of HH in which woman
owns in any part
Conditional on woman owning in any part, %
of HH in which woman has the right to (…)
Use Sell Decide how to spend
money generated from
Use Sell Decide how to spend
money generated from
Homestead land C 51 99 37 69 26 99 69 84
T 59 99 28 47 24 99 66 76
Cultivable land C 4 98 33 75 2 98 63 85
T 8 98 26 47 3 98 66 73
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Includes all land assets asked about in 2012 survey, except those which few households in either intervention arm reported owning (uncultivated land, garden, pond, other; these
are included in the aggregate measure in Table 4). N = 6066 (2599 control [C] and 3467 treatment [T]).
Table 10
Intrahousehold decisionmaking regarding livestock.
Treatment impact on women's decisionmaking
Woman
solely
decides
She has any
voice in
deciding
She and her
husband
jointly decide
Her husband
solely
decides
Whether to buy a cow 0.046*** 0.182*** 0.124*** 0.002
(0.009) (0.024) (0.016) (0.003)
Whether to sell a cow 0.082*** 0.242*** 0.132*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.003)
Whether to lease a cow 0.069*** 0.210*** 0.121*** 0.004
(0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.003)
Dairy maintenance expenses
(buying feed, medicine, etc)
0.145*** 0.424*** 0.233*** 0.024***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.005)
Selling milk 0.131*** 0.365*** 0.201*** 0.009***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.003)
Giving milk to children −0.006 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002)
Giving milk to other
members of the household
−0.017 0.117*** 0.137*** 0.002
(0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.005)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted
for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
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ﬁrst is that formost assets (though not all), thewoman's right to use the
asset appears to be independent of whether she herself owns the asset;
nearly 100% of women in both treatment and control groups have use
rights over most of these assets conditional on anyone in the household
owning them. There do appear to be some exceptions to women's use
rights including for bicycles and rickshaws, particularly in the treatment
group, although it is difﬁcult to determine whether these come from
mobility issues or are artifacts of the small sample of households
owning the assets to begin with. Second, in nearly all cases, the share
of women reporting rights over each asset conditional on ownership is
higher in the control group than in the treatment group. This pattern ap-
pears conditional on household ownership aswell as conditional on the
woman's own perceived ownership (although again shares are slightly
higher within the latter subset than in the full sample). It also applies to
both sale rights and spending-decision rights. Again these descriptive
statistics cannot be interpreted as causal impacts of the program. How-
ever, they again support the possibility that, when livestock is trans-
ferred to women by TUP, women's perception of “owning” non-
livestock assets translates to their having slightly lower sales and
spending-decision rights than in the absence of the program.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest several implications for how
impacts on ownership may translate to control rights. Given the large
signiﬁcant household-level program impacts shown in Table 4 and the
fairly consistent association between household ownership and
women's use rights, women's rights to use a large range of livestock
and non-livestock assets were likely strengthened by the program.
Findings also suggest that the large positive program impacts on
women's perceived ownership of livestock may translate to somewhat
strengthened alienation rights, but limited rights to obtain concrete eco-
nomic beneﬁts from livestock. Moreover, although Table 4 showed
some positive program impacts in women's perceived ownership of ag-
ricultural productive assets, non-agricultural productive assets, and
consumer durables, these may not translate to meaningful alienation
rights over the assets nor strengthened rights to obtain concrete eco-
nomic beneﬁts from them.
Overall, although the program signiﬁcantly increased women's per-
ceived ownership of livestock and may have particularly strengthened
their alienation rights over high-value cattle, results suggest that the in-
creases in women's control rights over other assets may have been lim-
ited to use; in particular, it appears unlikely that the program
meaningfully increased women's rights to decide how to spend income
generated from any asset. Under the assumption (described in footnote
22) that men typically have control rights over nearly all assets in the
household regardless of who is perceived to own them, these ﬁndings
suggest that although there were likely meaningful increases in
women's control over livestock, looking across asset categories, men's
relative resource control likely increased more than women's.
5.3.4. Intrahousehold decision making related to livestock
Having explored individuals' relative resource control within the
household, we then turn to examining intrahousehold decisionmaking.We start by exploringprogram impacts onwhomakes decisions regard-
ing livestock management. Table 10 shows that the program increases
women's voice in all dimensions considered of decisionmaking relevant
to livestock. For decisions related to the livestock itself (e.g., buying a
cow, selling a cow, etc.), we see that the program signiﬁcantly increases
women's sole decisionmaking in addition to joint decisionmaking.
Given that social norms in Bangladesh typically categorize buying and
selling of high-value assets like cattle as in the realm ofmen, this ﬁnding
is notable. In terms ofmilk, the programdoes not increasewomen's sole
decision making, but does increase joint decision making. These ﬁnd-
ings are consistent with the descriptive results on control rights;
women's increased alienation rights over livestock align with greater
decisionmaking power on sales of the cattle themselves, but limited
changes in the right to spend generated income aligns with more limit-
ed decisionmaking power on what to do with the milk produced by
cattle.
5.3.5. Ultra-poor women's decisions to work and use their earnings
We next turn to program impacts on women's decisions to work.
Our survey asks whether women are “doing any work or business that
brings in cash, additional food, or allows you to accumulate assets for
your household,” then asks whether this work is inside the home, out-
side the home, or both. We construct indicators for whether the
woman works at all, for whether the woman works inside the home
(potentially in addition to outside the home), and for whether the
woman works outside the home (potentially in addition to inside the
home). Table 11 Panel A shows that while the program does not affect
the proportion of women who work, it does change where women
work. The program causes about a 17 percentage point increase in
Table 11
Decisions regarding women's work, location of work, and control of earnings from
women's work.
Decision Impact
estimate
Panel A: Women's work and location of work
Treatment impact on
Whether the main female works 0.009
(0.015)
Whether the main female works inside the home 0.167***
(0.024)
Whether the main female works outside the home −0.080***
(0.017)
6066
Panel B: Control over earnings of women who work
Treatment impact on whether the main female works and
Keeps all of the income earned −0.077***
(0.015)
Keeps any of the income earned −0.044**
(0.019)
Keeps none of the income earned 0.053***
(0.014)
Panel C: Decisionmaking over earnings of women who work
Treatment impact on whether main female works and
She solely decides how to spend the money she earns −0.092***
(0.015)
She has any voice in deciding how to spend the money she earns 0.006
(0.015)
She and her husband jointly decide how to spend the money she earns 0.105***
(0.016)
Her husband solely decides how to spend the money she earns 0.003
(0.006)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted
for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
Table 12
Decisionmaking relevant to credit, savings, and speciﬁc categories of household
expenditures.
Treatment impact on decisionmaking
Woman
solely
decides
She has
any
voice in
deciding
She and her
husband
jointly
decide
Her
husband
solely
decides
Panel A: Decisions on credit and savings
Whether to take a loan 0.079*** 0.273*** 0.176*** 0.007**
(0.008) (0.016) (0.014) (0.003)
How to spend proceeds of a loan 0.078*** 0.274*** 0.179*** 0.006*
(0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.003)
How much to save −0.106*** 0.000 0.123*** 0.002
(0.015) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
Panel B: Decisions on speciﬁc household expenditure categories
Food −0.130*** −0.030** 0.098*** 0.030**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Housing −0.126*** −0.050*** 0.078*** 0.050***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Healthcare −0.124*** −0.051*** 0.079*** 0.051***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted
for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
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about an 8 percentage point decrease in women working outside the
home. Since the types of assets provided to women by the program re-
quiremaintenance at home, the implications for time allocationmay ex-
plain this pattern. We also note that this ﬁnding may imply a reduction
in women's mobility as a whole, since the qualitative work indicates
that women tend to have limited ability to leave the homestead unless
their work directly requires it.
We then analyze impacts on what women do with the income they
earn. Our survey asks whether women give all the money they earn to
their husbands/other family members, give some to their husbands/
other family members, or keep it all. We construct the following indica-
tors from these responses: whether the woman works and keeps all of
the money; whether the woman works and keeps any of the money;
whether the womanworks and keeps none of themoney. These indica-
tors are deﬁned unconditionally such that, for the ﬁrst for example, a
woman who does not work is coded with 0, a woman who does work
and does not keep all of the money she earns is coded as 0, and a
woman who does work and does keep all of the money she earns is
codedwith 1. Table 11 Panel B shows that the program signiﬁcantly de-
creases the proportion of women who work and keep all or any of the
money they earn (by about 8 percentage points or 4 percentage points
respectively), while the proportion that keeps none of the money
earned increases by about 5 percentage points.
Finally, we analyze who decides how to use the money earned by
women who work. Our survey asks “Who usually decides how to
spend the money you earn?”, with response options of “yourself; your
husband; self and husband; self and other HH member; and someone
else.”We construct four indicators from these responses: whether the
woman works and solely decides how to spend the money she earns;
whether the woman works and has any voice in deciding how to
spend the money she earns; whether the woman works and herhusband solely decides how to spend themoney she earns; and wheth-
er the woman works and she and her husband jointly decide how to
spend the money she earns. Again, these are unconditional indicators.
Table 11 Panel C shows that the program signiﬁcantly reduces the pro-
portion of householdswhere awomanworks and solely decides how to
use the money she earns (by about 9 ppt), while it signiﬁcantly in-
creases the proportion of householdswhere the decision ismade jointly
between the woman and her husband (by about 10 percentage points).
Taken together, these ﬁndings raise the possibility that the shift in
location of women's work due to the program may also shift control
and decision-making over the income earned by women. In particular,
given social norms of female seclusion, women who do not work out-
side the home may not have reason to leave the home at all. A shift to
working exclusively inside the homemay translate to no longer having
the mobility to make use of income independently (e.g., going to the
market), but rather giving the money earned to another household
member who will leave the home and deciding jointly what to do
with it.5.3.6. Intrahousehold decisionmaking related to expenditures
We then turn to impacts on decisionmaking on issues more broadly
affecting the household. Table 12, Panel A, shows how the program af-
fects who has a voice in decisions relevant to credit and savings. We
see that the program signiﬁcantly increases women's role in
decisionmaking relevant to loans – both in whether to take one and
how to spend it – in terms of sole and joint decisionmaking. Husbands'
sole decision making is not substantially affected in terms of loans. This
pattern is consistent with the program facilitating loans to women. Pro-
gram participant women are eligible to take BRAC microﬁnance loans
after two years of grant supports, and earlier evidence showed that
about 68% of TUP program participants took loans from BRAC during
the three year period after they completed the TUP program support-
cycle (Das and Shams, 2010). However, in terms of saving, the program
signiﬁcantly decreases women's sole decision making and signiﬁcantly
increases joint decisionmaking.
Table 12, Panel B, shows impacts on who decides about speciﬁc cat-
egories of expenses. Patterns of impacts across food, housing, and health
care are very similar. The program signiﬁcantly reduces the proportions
of households inwhichwomen solely decide or have any voice in decid-
ing how to spend on these categories, while it signiﬁcantly increases the
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decisions are made jointly.
Table 13 shows that the program signiﬁcantly reduces the propor-
tion of women controlling the money needed to buy food or items for
themselves. There is approximately a 15 percentage point reduction in
women controlling the money needed to buy food from the market, a
12 percentage point reduction for clothes for themselves, a 15 percent-
age point reduction for medicine for themselves, and a 7 percentage
point reduction for cosmetics for themselves.
These impacts are consistent with the previous results showing that
the program causes women to shift work inside the home and have less
control over their earnings. Here we ﬁnd that, even beyond reducing
women's control over their own earnings, the program causes them to
have less control and decision making power over household expenses
as a whole.
5.4. Additional insights from qualitative ﬁndings
To add nuance to the quantitative ﬁndings on program impacts for
targeted women, we summarize some insights from the qualitative
study regarding beneﬁciaries' own perceptions (Das et al, 2013). In
terms of sex-disaggregated asset ownership and control, results from
the qualitative study are remarkably consistent with results from the
quantitative analysis. Both men's and women's focus groups drawn
from beneﬁciary households stated that the transferred livestock assets
either belonged to women or were jointly owned. Even when the asset
was seen as jointly owned, women were seen to have authority and
veto power over such decisions as whether to sell the asset or to give
it to a relative. These ﬁndings closely match the quantitative impact es-
timates on women's ownership and control over livestock. Focus group
participants indicated that their stance was encouraged by the mode of
operation of the TUP programwhich, without explicitly stating that the
asset was being transferred to women, directed support and on-going
training in managing the asset toward women. There was little direct
exploration in the qualitative work on how resources were mobilized
to purchase new assets and who owned and controlled these new as-
sets. However, as noted in Section 5.3, the prevailing patterns of asset
ownership described in Section 5.1 are consistent with nearly all non-
livestock assets being perceived as owned by men.
Qualitative ﬁndings also support the quantitative ﬁnding that the
program caused beneﬁciary women to more likely stay within the
homestead and less likely be employed outside the home. Focus groups
reported that transferred livestock required maintenance at home and
raised women's workloads between about one to three hours per day.
However, the qualitative work highlighted many intangible beneﬁts
perceived by targeted women, which were not easily explored through
the quantitative work. One striking ﬁnding was that, while many bene-
ﬁciary women described reduced mobility and heavy workloads due to
the program, there was consensus that their situation was nonetheless
preferable to working outside the home given low pay and high stigmaTable 13
Whetherwomen control themoney needed for purchases of food or items for themselves.
Treatment impact on whether the woman herself controls the money needed to
buy …
Food from the market −0.151***
(0.017)
Clothes for herself −0.120***
(0.018)
Medicine for herself −0.153***
(0.017)
Cosmetics for herself −0.068***
(0.019)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted
for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.associated with the options commonly available to extremely poor
rural women (e.g., work as domestic servants, agricultural day labor,
employment by others in small businesses such as weaving with
handlooms). Respondents described the stigma as a particularly impor-
tant factor. Work outside the home was considered not respectable be-
cause it forced women to transgress religious and social norms of
segregation, which could lead to reputational damage. Reputation was
considered especially important to maintain for extremely poor
women, as they felt they could become physically vulnerable, socially
excluded, or harassed if socially stigmatized or considered of ill repute.
Similarly, while quantitative impacts on decisionmaking suggested
that the program signiﬁcantly reducedwomen's voices in several tangi-
ble dimensions, the qualitative work indicated that female beneﬁciaries
felt greater empowerment inmany intangible dimensions.Many report-
ed that they had gained conﬁdence and social status, both in communi-
ties and in households, by helping to improve the economic conditions
of their households. A speciﬁc way in which women described gaining
conﬁdence is in fact consistent with the quantitative ﬁnding that the
program increased household ownership of consumer durables, which
could be “used” by women even if owned by men — some women re-
ported that having access to improved clothing made themmore likely
to be included in community activities and no longer uncomfortable to
go places where they used to feel humiliated because of torn clothes.
Beneﬁciary women also reported being less ashamed of their homes
and nowbeing able to use their own sanitary latrines rather than having
to ask a neighbor. They also reported now having enough conﬁdence to
participate in localmediation hearings. In summary, while the quantita-
tive analysis showed decreases in several tangible domains associated
with empowerment (such as having a voice in decisionmaking), the
qualitative showed increases in several intangible domains (such as
feeling self-conﬁdent and gaining social capital).
In fact, very few of the program impacts thatwomen themselves cited
were focused on individual rights or explicitly on material gains. Rather,
they framed perceptions of impact more in terms of intangibles: social
capital, self-conﬁdence, satisfaction in contributing to the household,
etc. These observations highlight the importance of consideringwhat out-
comes are valued by beneﬁciaries themselves given their context, in addi-
tion to considering outcomes perceived as important more generally.
6. Summary and conclusions
6.1. Summary of ﬁndings
Overall the quantitative ﬁndings, complemented with the qualita-
tive study, suggest two key points. First, consistent with the ﬁndings
of Bandiera et al (2013), the program signiﬁcantly increased
household-levelwell being asmeasured by ownership of various assets;
however, as measured by both quantitative and qualitative work, the
program's impacts in terms of “tangible” outcomes on targeted
women are quite ambiguous. While women's ownership and control
over the transferred livestock are signiﬁcantly increased (including
over high-value assets such as cattle, typically thought to be a “men's
asset”), there appears to be a greater increase in men's sole ownership
over new investment in other assets (agricultural and non-agricultural
productive assets, land, consumer durables). Moreover, the program
tends to shift women's work inside the home (likely because the trans-
ferred livestock requires maintenance on the homestead), which com-
bined with the increased workload, appears to reduce women's
mobility outside the homestead. Consistent with reduced mobility, the
program also signiﬁcantly reduces women's voice in a range of deci-
sions, both related to purchases for themselves and related to household
savings and expenditure.
Second, nonetheless, when “intangibles” and context are taken into
account based on qualitative analysis, the overall program impacts on
targeted women appear far more favorable (if still mixed). Beneﬁciary
women themselves frame project impacts more in terms of intangibles
Table A.1
Attrition of households eligible for gender analysis between 2007 and 2012 rounds.
Total Treatment Control
Total households eligible in 2007 sample 7392 4493 2899
Lost from sample by 2012 round 1326 1026 22.9% 300 10.4%
Stayed in sample through 2012 round 6066 3467 77.1% 2599 89.6%
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Eligible households refers to households that were eligible for the Specially
Targeted Ultra Poor (STUP) program and were headed by a male–female partnership
(i.e., either a male head with female spouse, or female head with male spouse).
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household, etc.) than in terms of individual rights or material gains.
Their reports indicate that the program increased their social capital
and self-conﬁdence in ways that are in fact consistent with the quanti-
tative ﬁndings — for example, having access to improved clothing
(even if owned by men) that made them more likely to be included in
community activities and less likely to feel humiliated and uncomfort-
able going to certain places. They also report that their contribution to
the economic improvement of their households (not necessarily their
own individual rights over the economic gains) increased their conﬁ-
dence and social statuswithin their households and communities. Addi-
tionally, the qualitative work indicates a consensus among beneﬁciary
women that, given the numerous hardships associated with work out-
side the home for extremely poor rural women (most notably the social
stigma given norms of female segregation as well as the generally hos-
tile and unsafe external labor market environment for women), they
preferwork inside the home even with the tradeoff of limited mobility.
Thus, beneﬁciary women's perceptions indicate they value intangible
outcomes in addition to tangible outcomes, and also frame certain tan-
gible outcomes more favorably given the local context than might be
perceived from an external viewpoint.
6.2. Conclusions
A number of compelling implications emerge from this study. First,
we ﬁnd strong evidence that asset transfers targeted to women can in-
crease women's ownership and control over the transferred asset. This
outcome may occur even in contexts where the transferred asset is
not typically thought of as a “woman's asset,” as was the case for high-
value livestock in this study. This ﬁnding in itself represents a small
transformation of gender norms. A caveat, however, is that we do not
know whether this ﬁnding would be sustained over the long term.
Given that beneﬁciary focus groups cited the intensive support from
BRAC as supporting women's ownership and control over the trans-
ferred livestock, it is possible that women's retention of the asset
would fade somewhat as program support was eventually withdrawn.
Second, however, an increase in a woman's ownership and control
over a transferred asset may not necessarily increase her overall control
over resources or bargaining position in the household. In this study,
only the assets directly transferred to the targeted woman appeared
to remain in her control, while control over assets purchased from the
generated income appeared to follow prevailing gender norms. Speciﬁ-
cally, the program appeared to cause greater increases in men's sole
ownership and control over new investments across several categories
of non-livestock assets (agricultural and non-agricultural productive as-
sets, consumer durables, and land) than in women's ownership and
control. It also reduced women's mobility (potentially reducing ability
to physically control resources) and their voice in a range of decisions
concerning themselves and their households. Consistent with theoreti-
cal models in economics that relate control over resources to decision
making power, it appears that women's overall control over resources
decreased relative tomen's, alongwith their relative intrahousehold de-
cision making power.
Third, in the context of asset transfer, if the transferred asset requires
maintenance at home, targeting the asset to womenmay shift women's
work inside the home. The desirability of working inside the homemay
depend on the local context (as highlighted in this study), but if it re-
duces mobility outside the home, it may also reduce women's
decisionmaking power over the use of resources.
Fourth, individuals may value both tangible and intangible outcomes.
While tangiblemeasures aremore readily captured in quantitative analy-
sis, it is important to also account for intangible factors (such as self-
esteem and social capital) when studying beneﬁts and costs of a program.
Fifth, in a broad sense, nuance is required in assessingwhether inter-
ventions improve “women's empowerment.” The study highlights that
even if a program's “household-level” impacts are quite unambiguouslypositive, effects on individuals within the household (such as the
targeted women in this study) may be more ambiguous and complex.
Additionally, some outcomes valued by individuals may be “intangible,”
and some that seem negative from an external viewpoint may be seen
more favorably in the local context. These ﬁndings are consistent with
other work in Bangladesh (e.g. Becker, 2012) suggesting the possibility
that women in rural Bangladesh may in fact value contributing to the
household more than having individual rights within the household.
One possible dimension to this preference relates towomen facing a po-
tential tradeoff between asserting individual rights and maintaining
family support. In sociocultural contexts where women's potential to
function in society is limited without the support and protection of
their husbands or other male household members, beneﬁts of creating
conﬂict within the household to assert individual rights may be
outweighed by costs of losing family support. For example, Brule
(2012) ﬁnds, in the context of rural India, that land inheritance laws
do not increase women's inheritance because women forgo claiming
their legal rights in favor of retaining their family safety net. In effect,
due to the need for both daily-life and old-age support systems from
family, women may not ﬁnd it worthwhile to assert individual rights
at the cost of household relations, ﬁnding instead that contributing to
the household serves them better. A second dimension however is
that, for sociocultural or other reasons, women's perception of beneﬁts
in rural South Asia may simply differ from prototypical Western norms.
Lastly, nonetheless, if increasingwomen's asset ownership and deci-
sion making power are explicit goals of a program, a focused interven-
tion such as a targeted asset transfer may not be sufﬁcient. In a
context such as rural Bangladesh, interventions aimed at increasing
women's decision-making power may need to engage not only
women, but also other household members (including men) and com-
munities, in an effort to fundamentally transform sociocultural norms.
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Table A.3
Control group intrahousehold livestock ownership, by asset type.
Number of livestock
Livestock Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned jointly by male and female Owned solely by male
Cows/buffalo 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.04
Goats/sheep 0.34 0.26 0.30 0.03 0.04
Chickens/ducks 1.44 1.21 1.39 0.11 0.03
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Control group means, accounting for attrition weights. N = 2599.
Table A.2
Probit estimation of probability of staying in sample between 2007 and 2012 rounds.
Baseline characteristic Coeff Baseline characteristic Coeff Baseline characteristic Coeff
Treatment indicator −1.412** Male head's years of education −0.021 Household's number of goats/sheep 0.017**
(0.656) (0.013) (0.009)
Whether household's residence is
dilapidated
−0.101* Whether male head has completed secondary school 0.690 Household's number of power pumps −2.044*
(0.054) (0.487) (1.133)
Household's wealth rank −0.033 Whether main female works as homemaker −0.143 Household's number of plows −0.165
(0.051) (0.121) (0.489)
Whether household owns land −0.766** Main female's years of education −0.017 Household's number of cowsheds 0.066
(0.375) (0.013) (0.089)
Household's area of cultivated land −0.009 Whether main female has completed secondary school −0.257 Household's number of shop premises 0.085
(0.006) (0.684) (0.327)
Household's value of cultivated land 0.000 Household's number of radios/cassette players −0.116 Household's number of boats −0.055
(0.000) (0.089) (0.320)
Household's area of pond land 5.522 Household's number of electric fans −0.080 Household's number of ﬁshnets 0.070
(245.559) (0.202) (0.131)
Household's value of pond land −0.001 Household's number of bicycles 0.062 Household's number of rickshaws/vans 0.102
(0.049) (0.163) (0.179)
Household's area of mortgaged land 0.010 Household's number of chairs 0.033 Household's number of trees 0.010
(0.011) (0.050) (0.012)
Household's value of mortgaged land 0.000 Household's number of tables −0.003
(0.000) (0.073) Observations 7392
Household's total savings 0.000 Household's number of choukis 0.017
(0.000) (0.041)
Household's total loans −0.047 Household's number of sofas 0.123
(0.059) (0.257)
Whether household owns home 0.162*** Household's number of mosquito nets 0.060
(0.059) (0.043)
Whether household has a latrine 0.663* Household's number of jewelry items 0.478
(0.349) (0.482)
Whether household has a tube well 0.112 Household's number of saris −0.088**
(0.342) (0.035)
Whether household has a kitchen 0.139 Household's number of cows 0.128
(0.122) (0.087)
Household's food deﬁcit −0.030 Household's number of chickens and ducks −0.006
(0.055) (0.040)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Estimation also includes branch dummies, interviewer code dummies, and dummies for missing values of indicators, as well as characteristics of the main female's predictions for
her sons' and daughters' futures. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
Table A.4
Control group intrahousehold ownership of agricultural assets, by asset type.
Number of agricultural assets
Asset Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned solely by male Owned jointly by male and female
Choppers 0.63 0.33 0.47 0.16 0.10
Stored crops (kg) 4.24 1.12 2.83 1.40 1.37
Cowsheds 0.29 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.04
Deep tube wells 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ladders 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Mowing machines 1.32 0.58 0.87 0.44 0.20
Plows 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Axes 0.38 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.05
Pumps 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Control group means, accounting for attrition weights. N = 2599.
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Table A.5
Control group intrahousehold ownership of nonagricultural assets, by asset type.
Number of nonagricultural assets
Asset Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned solely by male Owned jointly by male and female
Bicycles 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00
Mobile phones 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.01
Sewing machines 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bamboo materials 1.19 0.77 1.05 0.14 0.22
Trees 1.68 0.53 0.93 0.76 0.17
Cash (taka) 447.43 264.33 337.93 30.21 51.47
Rickshaws 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
Fishnets 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
Cottage materials 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Control group means, accounting for attrition weights. N = 2599.
Table A.6
Control group intrahousehold ownership of consumer durables, by asset type.
Number of consumer durables
Asset Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned solely by male Owned jointly by male and female
Chairs 0.61 0.17 0.40 0.21 0.14
Beds 1.27 0.46 0.85 0.35 0.25
Almirahs 0.33 0.17 0.26 0.07 0.06
TVs 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tube wells 0.32 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.06
Cooking instruments 3.78 2.67 3.52 0.25 0.60
Men's clothing items 5.46 0.12 3.40 2.04 0.06
Women's clothing items 6.81 3.64 6.71 0.08 0.10
Silver jewelry items 8.38 6.82 8.23 0.03 0.21
Gold jewelry items 1.75 1.29 1.73 0.01 0.01
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Control group means, accounting for attrition weights. N = 2599.
Table A.7
Control group intrahousehold ownership of land, by asset type.
Area of land
Land Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned solely by male Owned jointly by male and female
Homestead land 2.06 0.56 0.93 1.12 0.02
Cultivable land 1.01 0.19 0.51 0.45 0.01
Pond 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Control group means, accounting for attrition weights. N = 2599.
Table A.8
Control group decisions regarding women's work, location of work, and control of earnings from women's work.
Decision Control group mean
Panel A: Women's work and location of work
Whether the main female works 0.82
Whether the main female works inside the home 0.50
Whether the main female works outside the home 0.71
Panel B: Control over earnings of women who work
Proportion of households in which main female works and
Keeps all of the income earned 0.38
Keeps any of the income earned 0.65
Keeps none of the income earned 0.17
Panel C: Decisionmaking over earnings of women who work
Proportion of households in which main female works and
She solely decides how to spend the money she earns 0.42
She has any voice in deciding how to spend the money she earns 0.80
Her husband solely decides how to spend the money she earns 0.03
She and her husband jointly decide how to spend the money she earns 0.31
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Control group means, accounting for attrition weights. N = 2599.
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Table A.9
Impacts on intrahousehold ownership of agricultural assets, by asset type.
Treatment impact on number of agricultural assets
Asset Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned jointly by male and female Owned solely by male
Choppers 0.121*** −0.007 0.006 0.018 0.114***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.013) (0.017)
Stored crops (kg) 4.905*** 1.440* 2.590** 0.018 2.238***
(1.246) (0.832) (1.069) (0.475) (0.589)
Cowsheds 0.258*** 0.075*** 0.121*** 0.036*** 0.138***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.009) (0.012)
Deep tube wells 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ladders 0.009 0.003 −0.001 −0.006*** 0.009**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Mowing machines 0.069 −0.017 0.025 0.023 0.038
(0.057) (0.032) (0.048) (0.027) (0.034)
Plows 0.020*** 0.002 0.007** 0.001 0.012**
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006)
Axes 0.162*** 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.025** 0.088***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017)
Pumps 0.010*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.001 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
Table A.10
Intrahousehold ownership of nonagricultural assets, by asset type.
Treatment impact on number of nonagricultural assets
Asset Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned jointly by male and female Owned solely by male
Bicycles 0.026*** −0.002 0.008 0.002 0.020***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
Mobile phones 0.076*** −0.005 0.018 0.000 0.053***
(0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008)
Bamboo materials −0.089 −0.111** −0.164*** −0.055* 0.073***
(0.059) (0.044) (0.056) (0.029) (0.022)
Trees 1.768*** 0.461* 0.878*** 0.364*** 0.887*
(0.563) (0.274) (0.300) (0.085) (0.476)
Rickshaws 0.018*** −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.016***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Fishnets 0.025* −0.017** −0.009 0.003 0.033***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009)
Cottage materials 0.041** 0.033*** 0.031** −0.002 0.009*
(0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.005)
Source: Author's computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
Table A.11
Intrahousehold ownership of consumer durables, by asset type.
Treatment impact on number of consumer durables
Asset Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned jointly by male and female Owned solely by male
Chairs 0.244*** 0.051*** 0.096*** 0.023 0.149***
(0.035) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.024)
Beds 0.180*** −0.025 −0.009 0.025 0.204***
(0.033) (0.023) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029)
Almirahs 0.104*** 0.011 0.024 0.001 0.076***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.008) (0.012)
Tube wells 0.136*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.004 0.074***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013)
Cooking instruments 0.278*** 0.063 −0.079 −0.115* 0.357***
(0.103) (0.098) (0.113) (0.063) (0.058)
Men's clothing items 1.461*** 0.021 0.805*** −0.028* 0.636***
(0.196) (0.022) (0.146) (0.017) (0.091)
Women's clothing items 0.734*** 0.076 0.554** −0.078*** 0.176***
(0.239) (0.126) (0.252) (0.024) (0.051)
Silver jewelry items −1.379 −1.176 −1.365 −0.208 −0.032
(1.094) (0.950) (1.086) (0.177) (0.034)
Gold jewelry items 0.538* 0.054 0.319 −0.003 0.035***
(0.324) (0.216) (0.296) (0.004) (0.009)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
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Table A.12
Intrahousehold ownership of land, by asset type.
Treatment impact on area of land
Land Total owned in household Owned solely by female Owned in any part by female Owned jointly by male and female Owned solely by male
Homestead land 0.539*** 0.060 0.108 0.028* 0.420***
(0.120) (0.053) (0.072) (0.016) (0.092)
Cultivable land 0.542** 0.134* 0.072 −0.001 0.519***
(0.217) (0.071) (0.140) (0.006) (0.149)
Source: Authors' computations based on BRAC STUP evaluation data, 2007 and 2012.
Notes: Single-difference estimates with attrition weights; robust standard errors adjusted for survey design and clustering in parentheses. Each cell represents a separate regression.
*** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. N = 6066.
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